Introduction
European Jihadism, 1 in the strict senseofthe term, began in France in the 1980s. Between 1970 and 1980, France was the target of terrorist actions from the Middle East, mainly from Lebanon and Palestine,bythe Abu Nidal groups,Carlos,or, at the beginningo ft he 1990s,a ssociated with the Hezbollah. It was Iranian state terrorism (the assassination of Shapour Bakhtiar on 6August1991) which madea deep impression and had no deep roots in the French society.Until then, we had primarily witnessed acts of terrorism involvingforeign actors or actors associated with conflicts,the outcomeofwhich took place in France.Local grievances were marginal, or non-existent. It was mainly in relation to the Algerian military coup 1B yJ ihadism, we meanaviolent form of mobilisation in the name of ar adical version of Islam which advocates the Jihad against the godless West and the Muslim countries which are also impious as aresult of their Jahiliya, that is,their regressiontoa situation of idolatry,similar to the period preceding the Prophet of Islam. response against the British involvement in the Iraq war initiated by the US. European Jews are killed by the Jihadistterrorists due to the Israeli repression of the Palestinians.B ut some attacks have no geo-strategicr easons: Thea ttacks againstt he Charlie Hebdoj ournalists in January 2005 by the Kouachi brothers was due to the desecration of the Prophet Mohamedb yt hat magazinea nd no foreign policy motive was put forward by them.Coulibaly,another jihadist who killed Jews in asupermarket close to Paris referred to Daesh for his attacks against them but the major reason was the caricatures of the Prophet by the magazinefor the two major assailants,t he brothers Kouachi. Globalization 2 affects as well Jihadi terrorists who mingle with the others in Syria, Iraq, Mali, Yemen and Libya, although linguistic and cultural markers are still prevalent. ManyE uropean Jihadists learn to be "neo-Umma"(the imaginary Umma conceived by the Jihadists) followers once outside theircountries of birth and become insensitive to the plight of theirformer fellowcountrymen whom they characterize as "miscreants" and whose plightduring the terrorist attacksinEurope becomes aminute damage in their eyes,compared to that of the Muslims suffering from the misdeeds of the Western governments.InEurope, 3 terrorism in the name of Allahconcernsonly a minute fractionofMuslims but its social impact, disruptingsociety and creating a profound crisis at the level of the symbolic foundation of socialorder, is in no way relatedeither to the effective number of its perpetrators,ortothat of its victims.
Several generations of European Jihadis
Severalgenerations of Islamist radicals,which can be identified in Europe, 4 share the characteristic of being what the British call "homegrown" terrorists, meaning that they were brought up and educated in Europeancountries.The first known case beginswith the military coup dØtat in Algeria in 1992. This put an end to the 1991 parliamentary electionsinwhich the Islamic SalvationFront (FIS) obtained the majorityv ote.T his Front gradually became at errorist group,t he Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA)a nd then formed several smaller Jihadi groups, which intended to punish France for its support of the army.The Sahrawi imam, from the moderate wing of the FIS waskilled on 11 July 1995 in Paris.Inthe same year,abomb plantedi nt he Saint Michel/Notre-Dame station on line Bi nt he RER Parisian underground killed8people and wounded 117. On 17 August another attack took place at the Etoile in Paris in which 17 people were wounded by ahome-made bomb.Then there was afurther unsuccessful attack on the highspeed Paris-Lyon railway on 26 August 1995. Khaled Kelkal, ay oung man of Algerian originw as involved in these attacks;a long with othersl ike Karim 2R aflik 2016. 3N eumann 2015. 4A kbarzadeh 2010. Koussa, his friend, Boualem Bensaïda nd af ew other Jihadis,t hey committed attacksinFrance. Khaled Kelkalwas killed in aconfrontation with the police on 29 September 1995.
After him, and thoseinhis orbit, we can list the case of the Roubaix Gang;most of the members had foughti nB osnia in 1994-95 during the war in Yugoslavia, alongside the Muslim militia. After the Dayton Accords in December 1995, which ended the war, the members of the group came back to France and organised hold-ups to financethe holy war.
Throughout 1996, the members of the group which comprised French converts, like Lionel Dumonea nd Christophe Cazea nd youths of North African origin including Ommar Zemmiri, Mouloud Bouguelaneand Hocine Bendaoui carried out hold-ups in the area surroundingR oubaix and Lille.O n29March 1996 the police moved in on their flat in Roubaix;four members of the groupdied in the fire which broke out, three others succeeded in escaping, one of them being killed in aconfrontationwith the Belgian police.The gang was thus disbanded.
Since then,t here have been the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005;all the others have been neutralized by the police across Europe.Itwas not until 2012 that we witnessed successful attacks in France under the aegis of Mohammed Merah, ayoung Frenchman of Algerian origin. In March 2012, he killed 7people and wounded 6inToulouse and Montauban. These included3soldiers,of whom 2were Muslims,and 4people who were Jewish.
Tw oyears later, on 24 May 2014, Mehdi Nemmouche assassinated 4people in the Jewish Museum in Brussels.
Less than one year later, the two brothers,Saïdand ChØrif Kouachi killed 12 people in the attack on the weekly publication Charlie Hebdo on 7J anuary 2015, to punish the journalists for desecrating the Prophet of Islam in their caricatures. On 8and 9January of the same year, 5people,apolicewoman and 4Jewish people were killed by Amedy Coulibaly,who acted in liaison with the Kouachi brothers. He met the younger one,ChØrif, in prison.
The characteristics typical of home-grown Jihadis:
young people from poorer suburbs to the middle classes
What do these acts have in common?W ec ould create ap rofile of the "homegrown Jihadi" on the basis of theseattacks from 1995 to Charlie Hebdo in January 2015; 5 they are all young people who have been in trouble with the law,h ave a historyofoffending either for robbery or being involved in trafficking;they are on file for delinquency and the great majority have served prison sentencesf or variousp eriods.W ith the exception of Kelkal, who seems to have had af airly 5O ne can extend this considerationt oamoreg eneral terrorist mindset. See Post 2007; Horgan 2005. "normal" family,t he others all had an unhappy childhood, often in residential institutions and ahistoryofmental instability which has made of thempeople with problems from av ery young age (this was also true for Zakarias Moussaoui, imprisoned for life in 2006 in the UnitedStates for his part in the 9/11 attacks in September 2001). Almost none of them were practising Muslims;t hey became "born again" Muslims,orJihadi converts,under the influence of aguru, friends,or on the basisoftexts read on the Internet 6 or in prison. 7 Lastly, by far the majority had made ajourney of initiation to acountry in the MiddleEast or to awar zone (Iraq, Syria,Afghanistan, Pakistan).Amedy Coulibaly was an exception;hewas influenced by DjamelB eghal. Form ost of them, we witness at rain of events startingwith life in adeprived suburb or in apoor urban area in the UK,delinquency,prison, ajourneytoawar zone and radical Islamisation.
Themajority of middle class youths found their vocationtoJihadism after the 13 November 2015 attacks in Paris.These young people,eitherofmiddle classor working class origin, are often second generation (as was the case for the majority of the perpetrators in the attacks on 13 November) but, among them,the sponsor from Daesh, was third generation.
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In the UK,one memberofthe group of doctors and engineers who attempted to commit aterrorist attack at Glasgow Airport on 30 June 2007, Kafeel Ahmed, was borni nI ndia and was therefore af irst generation Jihadi;s imilarly in the United States,T ashfeenMalik, the wife of the Jihadi, Syed Rizwan Farook, was a first generation immigrant.Thereistherefore nothing specific aboutgenerationin this respect.
The Jihadism of disaffected youths or the sanctification of hatred
We can distinguish two types of Jihadis depending on the social class: those of middlec lass origin and those from the working classes,t he majority being of immigrant origin along with some converts.InF rance,middle class youths who have participated in Jihadi attacks were atiny minority before the 13 November 2015 attacks. Them ental universe of thed isaffectedy outh, to use the British term, who embrace radical Islam is characterised by ahatred of society engendered by the ingrained feelingthat they have of profound socialinjustice towardsthem. They experience exclusiona saheavy cross to bear,astigma visible to all, with their accent, their languagew ith its slang( verlan)a nd Anglo-Arabice xpressions divested of their original meaning as well as their body language which is perceived as threateningb yo ther citizens.T hey have broken their ties with society and reject the wearing of auniform (even as afireman) as an emanationofarepressive order. Their identity is defined in their antagonism to the society of the "integrated" whether they be French of Gallic or North African descent or British of Pakistani origin who have succeeded in risingtothe rank of the middle classes. Stigmatized in the eyes of others,t hey are intensely aware of being subject to discrimination;this is conveyed by aggressive behaviour which is easily set off,not only towards other people but also,and frequently,towards members of their own family,inparticular ayoung brother or sister who would dare to go out with aboy (they themselvesg oo ut with the sisterso ft heir friends but double standards operateinrelationtowomen).The suburb-ghetto becomesaninternalprison and their self-hatred becomeshatred of others with their negative evaluation of others becoming alack of self-esteem. Their mainaim is to demonstratetheir rebellion throughn egative actions, rather than by endeavouring to denounce racism by getting involveds ocially.H owever, by dint of hard work, someo ft heir fellow brothers do succeed in overcoming exclusion and in entering the middle classes. But as aresult they leave the poorer suburbs and often break their ties with their old friends.R elegatedt ot heir local area or even to af ew blockso fh ouses,t he excluded youthsresort to delinquency and the searchfor easy money to live the kind of middle classlife of their dreams,sometimes even going further whenthey get their hands on fairly large sums of money which they squander with their friends,e ven if this means going back to delinquency which gradually becomes criminal. Theplight which most affects them is victimisation and the certainty that the only means of acceding to the amenities of the middle classes is delinquency; according to them,s ociety has closed all the other entrances. As long as hatred finds an escape routei nd elinquency,i ti sa llayed by access for short periods to material comfort followed by the dissipation of illegally acquired goods.But for a tiny minority, deviancea lone does not suffice;t hey require af orm of self-affirmation which combines several features:the restoration of their lost dignityand the desire to assert their superiority over others by putting an end to theirlack of self-esteem. This is inherent to their innermost self as ar esult of their internalisationo ft he discrimination associated with living in poor housing estates,d elinquency and alife whichisunstructuredand devoid of any mental stability.The mutation from hatred to Jihadism consecratest heir anger and enablest hem to overcome their malaise by adhering to avision, which makes of them aknight of the faith,with the others being infidels who do not deserve to live.The life change is thus complete; the Self becomespure and the Otherimpure.Radical Islamism effects amagic reversal which transformslack of self-esteem into lack of esteem for others and lack of respect into consecration of the self at the expense of others. Henceforth, feelings of worthlessness and of lack of vocation in asociety in which the only means of survival were odd jobs and delinquency are ended. One becomes areal person and does everything to ensure that this realization that one seals by becoming aJihadi, is recognized by others,inparticular by the media. The media are inseparable from Jihadi action which only exists by combining violence with media coverage which makes aworld star of the young knight of the faith due to his most dreadful action.The bigger the space the media devotes to him, even posthumously,t he prouder he is of personifying the ultimatea ctions of af aith whose existence is due to the mutationoflack of self-esteem into hatred for others and the discrimination experienced into an ultimate form of sanctity.Insodoing, an identity whichh as broken with others endeavours to take revenge for its misfortune on the society in question, which becomes guilty in its totality,with no exception, or, in Jihadi jargon, heretic or infidel:ithas to be destroyed even if it means being killed as amartyr to the sacred cause.
In the Jihadi trajectory of youths from the deprived suburbs,p rison plays an essential role,not so much for the process of radicalization as for the fundamental reason that it affords the opportunity to nurture ahatredofsociety in the everyday relationships infused with tension and rejection when faced with the wardens and, more globally speaking, the penitentiary institution. Each time prisoners break the internal regulations in prison, punishmentsremind them of the existence of a system whose legitimacy they challenge because of this intense feeling of injustice in the inner core of their being. Their fates are experienced as having been forged on afundamental misunderstandingwith society as aconsequence of being only partly socialised. Prisond oes calm some,b ut most of the young peoplef ind therein more reason to hate society.I np rison, they form relationships with hardened criminals who are likely to show them new perspectivesondelinquency. Joining radical Islam oftentakes place in prison;inpart afunction of the boredom of beingleft to oneself in an institution which regards the Muslim differently to the Christian or the Jew. In prison the young delinquent experiences the lack of respectfor Islam in an institutional and impersonal form:the lack of or scarcity of Imams,non-celebration of prayers on Friday,orworship in conditionswhere an atmosphereofsuspicion surrounds the participants,such as the refusalofprayer mats in the recreation yard. Furthermore,the domination of the Salafists 9 over the Muslims in prison acts as apremonitory form of introduction to the rationale of rupture with society.U sual Salafistsa re not Jihadis but advocate an exclusive version of Islam whichcontributes to de-socialising young people by introducing an unbridgeable divide between the believer and the non-believer, the true Muslim, who is assiduous in their religious practice and the counterfeit Muslim, who is laxist and has little respect for religious taboos.
9T here are at least two distinct groups whose members claim to be Salafists.T he first, by far more numerous,encompassing more than ten thousand people in France are called "pietist"or"scientific"bythe others:they are apolitical, promote dawa (proselytism) ratherthan jihad. Thesecond, called Salafist jihadist, is aminority and believes that violent action against the "idolatrous" governments (taqut) is the only way to save Islam. See Olidort 2015. One may begin by being attracted by radicalIslamism;the harshness of prison, along with the amountoftime one spends alone with nothing much to do,makes people susceptible to the call of the sirens of sacred violence.I np rison, the attraction of radical Islamism is related to the reversal of roles,w hich is taking place in the troubled psyche of the youth. They have been judged and given a prison sentence; henceforth, it is the youthswho condemn society in no uncertain manner, the youthstake on the role of judge as knights of faith at war with the infidels.The reversal of roles restores the prisonersself-confidence,and he now becomes anoble individual carrying out adivine command. As aresult, hardened Islamists do not experienceany remorse when confronted with the extent of their violence and the dehumanisationoftheir victims to whom they deny any dignity.
One last fact convincest he apprentice Jihadi of the legitimacy of the cause which they defend, the initiation journeytoaMiddle East country where the holy war is raging.MØrah had been in Pakistan,Afghanistan and othercountries where radicalIslamism was rampant;Nemmouche had been in Tu rkey and was strongly suspected of having livedi nS yria for ay ear in 2012 alongside Jihadis;t he two Kouachi brothers had been in Yemen where they had had military training with Al Qaida in the Arabian peninsula;Amedy Coulibaly may be the exception, even if there are traces of him having been in Tu rkey and possibly in Syria.Inany event, he had met ac harismatic Jihadi, Beghal,w ho put him in touch with ChØrif Kouachi. In thiscase,the charismatic guru replaced the journeyofinitiation.
In mostc ases,t he initiation journey confirmedt he young Jihadi in their identity,byrenewing links in amythical mannerwith the Muslim societies,despite the fact that they neither speakt he language nor do they sharet he habits.T his journeyenablesthem to learn how to handle weapons,but at the same time,italso enablesthem to become "foreigners" to their own society. In particular,they learn how to become"cruel",how to execute hostages or persons whom they consider guilty (members of the police,soldiers,Jews,"bad Muslims") professionally and withoutaqualm,inaword, to become atruly committed warrior of the hyperbolic Jihad who has absolutely no moral misgivingsabout killing the "guilty".
The newmiddle class Jihadis
In 2013, before the civil war in Syria it was exceptional to find middle class youths amongst the Jihadis.Since 2013, along with youthsfrom rundown housing estates, they constitute aconsiderable proportion of the aspiring Jihadis who have flocked to Syriatooffer theirservices either to the Islamic State (Daesh) or other Jihadi groups, such as the al Nusra Front (Jabhat al Nusra), which is Al Qaida in tendency.A ccording to the statistics available,i ti se stimated that approximately 5,000 young Europeansh ave gone to Syria and numerous attemptstoleave for these countries (especially via Turkey) have been neutralised afterm any European countries passed laws to preventthese departures.
Theregressive utopia of the neo-Umma, combined with the role of the white knight to the Jihad does have an undeniable fascination not only on some of the youths from the poorer suburbs but also,a nd for different reasons, on young middle classyouthsinsearch of ameaning, and they comprise the secondgroup seducedbyJihadism since the civil war in Syria in 2013.
These middle class youths,o ften teenagers who are late developers (psychoanalysts considera dolescence lasts untilt he age of 20 or even 25 for late postadolescence), swell the ranks of the reserves of the Jihad by converting from almost any religion to radical Islam. DisenchantedC hristians in search of the thrills which institutionalised Catholicism cannot provide,s ecular Jews tired of their Jewishness with no religious roots, Buddhists from French families who converted to Buddhism some time ago and who are seeking arevitalized identity in the service of the holywar in contrast with the pacifist version of this religion in Europe.There are also young women, often from good families,who have joined the horde of contenders for the ever-intensifying Jihad, to some extent in search of apost-feminist experiencewhich they imagine will be somewhat exotic and give meaning to their rather boring lives.
In contrast to the youths from deprived areas,those of middle class origin are not motivated by hate for society;t hey have neitheri nteriorisedt he exclusion which the former have encountered nor do they consider themselves to be victimised. They invoke humanitarian grounds to justify their opposition to the fascistlike Assad government and many of them are at astage which could be described as "pre-Jihadist" 10 beforetheir departure for Syria or Iraq. Their problem is one of authority and norms.A uthority has been weakened by the now irreversible evolution of the stepfamily,and the rights of the child have createda"pre-adult" who is frequently an over-age adolescent. Thec ombination of an approachi n terms of rights and thef ragmentationo fa uthority between the various parents and asociety in which the norms have lost their stringency (including thoseofthe republic) createsacrisis in authoritywhich explainsthe attraction of an appeal to norms and arobust authority.Aminority of these youths are even fascinated by them as they suffer from havingseveral guardians but no single person in charge and would like the line betweenwhat is and what is not possibletobeexplicitly drawn. Islamist normsoffer them this vision in black and white;what is forbidden is defined very clearly.Radical Islamism enables one to combine the pleasure of a game and the deadly gravity of the Jihadi faith. It gives asense of conforming to intangible normsb ut also of beingt he agent who imposes these norms on the world,o fr eversing the role of the adolescent and the adult (the youth imposes them on frightenedadults), of being the person who establishes the sacred norms and whoimposes them on others under penalty of the holy war.
Fascinatedbythe Jihad, these young people are the personification of the antiMay 68 ideals:t hen, young people sought the intensification of pleasure in the infinityofsexual desire regained;nowadays the aim is to define the parameters of desire and, by meansofarigorous Islamism, impose restrictions on oneself thus raising oness elf-esteem. In thep ast one endeavoured to free oneself from unwarranted restrictions and hierarchies,nowadays these are eagerly sought. There is ademandfor sacred norms whichare beyond human judgement and side with divine transcendence;these norms are aspired to and consecrated, carried along by the holy war.
In the past, we were anarchist and we abhorred patriarchal power;nowadays we live in asociety devoid of meaning;radical Islamism,byseparating the role of the woman and that of the man, rehabilitates ad istorted version of patriarchy consecrated by reference to an inflexible and intransigent God, in contrast to a watered-down republicanismo ra no ver-humanised Christianity.M ay 68 was a continual partya nd the hippie movements aw itself as its continuation in the excitement of the exotic journey to Kathmandu or to Afghanistan, which had not yet fallen under the sway of the Jihad. Now the journey of initiationisaquestfor purity in the confrontationwith death in the name of martyrdom.
WomensLiberation was an integral part of May 68. Now post-feminist young women assert their wearinessw ith af eminism which has brought them formal equality which they have to assume alongwith the hazards of afreedomwhich is increasingly heavy to bear when confronted with aw orld which is still overwhelmingly masculine in its privileges and favours.
Alongside the fantasies of sacred standards,wealso find the quest for justice for Syria where abloodthirsty regime has killed more than 250,000 people according to various estimates,a nd has forced several million others to leave for neighbouringcountries.These young people identify withaform of humanitarian aid which operates under the auspices of aso-called caring Jihadism.There where the West has demonstratedi ts impotence when confronted with ab loodthirsty dictatorship,these young people,armed with anaïve faith, intend to combat evil in the name of af orm of religion whereas they do not grasp its monstrous and dehumanising aspects.The transition may take place gradually,aswas the case for some members of the gang in Roubaix, such as Christophe Caze who participated in humanitarian aid in the 1990s and then became aradical Islamist.
Apartfrom the post-adolescents,the affiliation of youngmiddle class adults to Jihadism in its version as exportedtoSyria poses the question of the malaise of these youths who suffer from the decline of the political system over and above their indignation at the lack of justice in aS yria which is rendered closeb yt he media and where crimes against humanity of monstrous dimensions are committed. As farasthe youthsfrom the deprived suburbs are concerned, an infra or supra-political attitude has been the general norm.S elf-absorption, withdrawal into the ghetto,oragain, into violence in its sordid (criminal)orsacred (Jihadism) version are attitudes locatedeither above or beyond the political.
11 In the middle 11 See Wievorka1988.
classes,s ince the 1980s politicsh as been undergoing am ajor crisis and aw hole generation has grown up with no political references whatsoever. Fort hem, Jihadism is the consequence of the eclipse of the political as ac ollective project generating hope.
The invention of the neo-Umma
Radical Islam has invented ac ustom-made neo-Umma whichh as absolutely nothingt od ow ith the historicalt radition of the religion of Allah.H istorically, appeals for Muslim solidarity have been made regionally or nationally to the Muslim community or Umma( and as of the 19 th century against Western colonialism). In the actual history of Muslimsocieties,the historical Umma has never included all Muslims and fromanearly date the Sunni /Shia division limited the scope.Radical Islamism has createdafantasy MuslimCommunity at planet level from scratch,which has no historical precedent. Theneo-Umma is autopia every bit as dangerous as ac lass-less society or one of the heavens on earth of the millenarians and, like all those hare-brainedu topias,t he danger it represents is the use of absolute violence in real life to implement it. In the neo-Umma, the evolution of Muslim societies is denied and the pure and simple return to the Age of the Salafs (Muhammedscompanions and his disciples to the 3 rd generationof the Hegira) is advocated literally,legitimating practicessuch as slavery:the Yezidis in Iraq were enslavedorkilled, theirwives and daughters sold,the primitive forms of TalionLaw (ghisas)broughtback into forceand summary judgements justified on the basis of the presumed transparencyofIslamic jurisdiction. Young "Jihadists" have an overwhelming urge to be partofthe neo-Umma as opposed to their own society which they dislike.T or aise theirs elf-esteem, JihadistI slam offers them the status of absolute hero,clad with the prestige of martyrdom which, as a mujahid they personify (a fighterfor the faith-the word having the same root as the jihad). They will kill, terrify, be hated and will be proud of the new status whicht hey have acquired by virtue of occupying the frontp age in the media, overcoming anonymity and insignificance by the unhealthy fascination that they exerto ver the media. This propagates the image of the "anti-hero" which he values especially, as it evokes absolute fear in others.Henceforth,heis"someone" and he has succeededinreplacing the contempt with which "white" people regard him with the fear of death which paralyzes them.Heisreadytodie and to kill, the others fear for their lives, therefore he is their superior.Inaway,hethinks they recognise this,b yd evoting the "front pages" of the media and whole issues exclusively to him.
Jihadism and the absence of political utopia
Since the FrenchRevolution, politics have played amajor role in the way citizens define themselves.Politics have played several roles which have revolved around the socialisationofcitizens, and their political and social advancement over time, the horizon being some point in the future.Even when poor, citizens could hope to improve their lot not only individually but by identifying with auniversalcause, like the freeing of the proletariat from the yoke of capitalism or again, the implementation of republican equality through education and by State intervention. Politicsalso played afundamental role in the subjectivity of citizens,that of their subjectivization and responsibility for their dignity.Itwas possible to be poor (an unskilled worker) but to be respected, identificationwith acauseshared by other workers enablingmaterial conditions to be overcomeinpursuit of an ideal society at some future point in time.
This civic constructionhas been shattered in the past few decades.Henceforth, the horizon of hope is not any nearer, contrary to the past, when all citizens could consider that the generation of theirc hildren would have ab etter social and economic situationthan their own.Atthe moment, young people,even those of the middle classes,are beset by the fear of downward socialmobility.Asfor those of workingclass origin, for the great majority of them the improvementoftheir situations by legal means seems to them unrealistic. To put it briefly,the prospect of social mobility is almost non-existent for almost everyone.B oth the young middle class person who fears downward socialm obility and ay outhf rom the deprived suburbs who has no faith in advancing his or her cause in the future, share al ack of future prospects.J ihadism reconstructs this lack of prospects on false premisesb ut whichy oung people do not take into consideration, in their desperate search for autopia which gives ameaning to their lives by means of the sacred (the meta-political) and by the promise of perspectives for (infra-political) social promotion.I nb oth cases,t he new utopia is both exaggerated( the metapolitical) and minimised (infra-political) and the consequence is apolitical vision which is hyper-repressive and hyper-regressive,b ut which young people do not realise.
Young people in Europe,where politics is at astandstill and no global project for society is visible,a re susceptible to mythical forms of politicisationw here promises of happiness on earth, in the name of afantasy neo-Umma and aheroic vision as afighterfor the faith confer meaning on lives totally devoid of any hope in the future.
The decline of the social utopias
Thea ttacks on 13 November 2015 revealed the extento ft he malaise and the identification of anumber of young people not only from the lower but alsofrom the middle classes with arepressive ideology whichisnow replacingsocial utopias such as republicanism and communism. Since the 1990s the crisis in inherently utopianideologies has led to the attractionofradical Islam as a"transcendent" utopia,which fills the ideological vacuum of modern societies.France,asithappens,isexperiencing adeeper formofmalaise becausethe basis of social life after the Revolution in 1789 has been political. Thecitizen is defined primarily by his or her commitment to the political pact establishingthe Nation-Stateasthe representative of the citizens,politics being simultaneously aprinciple of commitment to ar epublican project and the identificationo ft he citizen with ap rinciple of meaning which would enable the implementation of the ideals of liberty,equality and fraternity at some future point in time.T he crisis in equality and fraternity means that equality of citizenship as ap roject for the future is impossible,p articularly for the excluded.Any hope for the future in politicsisnow over;the last example was the movement for equality in 1986, which was at otally secular movement. Ther esult is that radical Islam has now replaced the citizenship project. Henceforth for the adepts of Jihadism,equality is achieved in death and not in life,fraternity in the killing of the enemyand liberty in the desire to inflict death as the representative of God,amerciless God, unrecognisable in the Islamic tradition -apure invention of those who see in belief only ajustification for killing instead of thep romise of ah appy life in aw orld where people live in peace. Jihadism acts as asubstitutefor the extreme left ideologies like Action directe in France,t he Red Brigadesi nI taly or the Baader-Meinhoff groupi nG ermany. What remains of these leftist groupscarries over into Jihadism some of the beliefs of this tendency,i fo nly because of the "anti-imperialism"o fr adical Islamism which is opposed to the American, and to alarge extent the European, hegemony in the Muslim, but also in the Western world.
Jihadism and hyper-secular societies
In the middle classes,t he appeal of Jihadism must be understood as being due both to the attraction of adream world that the Islamic State (Daesh) presents to young people 12 and the vacuum they face in their daily lives from which any "sacredm eaning" is banned in am ore or less unconscious manner. It is not surprising that the few young Jewish Jihadiswho have been recruited comefrom secularised Jewish families,t he same observation being true for Catholics and Protestants,while many come from secular, non-religious families.Alarge pro-12 Somescholars believe that ISIS (or Daesh) is arevolution. See Atran 2016. portion of young peopledonot endorse the hyper-secularization whichreigns in society. This is imposed as something obvious by the family and the general attitudeo fs ociety and am inority among new generations feel this more as a liabilityt han an asset. Desacralization at global level, that is,t he decline in Christianityand, more globally,the loss of meaning of the institutionalised religions renders the imagination inclinedtoseek in the unknownofnew hieratical worldsameaningfulness whichisnot provided elsewhere to those young people who suffer from the absenceofaninstitutionalised reference to the sacred. Fora minority of aspiring young peoplethe "dis-institutionalisation" of Christianity in France,and in Europe more generally, frees religion from the shacklesoftraditions but for others this leads to aquest for meaningfulness in sectarianism in all its forms.F or some, this is af orm of emancipation, but for others it is as ource of anguishgiven the absence of markers with respect to the sacred. Thequest for a Jihadist Islam combines severalregisters inherent to the exoticaspects of afaith which provides astrong sense of the sacredand whose very intransigence breaks with the weakening of the Hieros/Sacred in present-day society.Furthermore, the many splits in step-families encourage the search for meaning concordantwith a repressive Sacred, where absence of authoritym utates into an inflexible authoritarianism within radicalI slam,w hich is then desired for its extreme,r epressive character. Everythings eemst oi ndicatet hat ap roportion of young people from the middle classes combine the searchfor adventure,revolutionary romanticism,the desire to experience aform of "otherness" (the Sacred) and the desire to proveo neself by submitting willingly to ar epressive form of interpretation of meaning. In European societies in which hyper-secularisation is synonymous with the denial of any transcendence,the Sacred is returning in the form of an oppressive configuration. This is both the result of adesire to prove oneselfbycontact with the Other (the experience of something radically different) and of embracing happiness in contrast with the gloomofasociety in whicha large proportion of young people suffer from the fear of downward social mobility,o fp roletarianization. Thea spirationt oJ ihadism is in reality aq uest for meaning throughthe "Jihadisation" of onesrelationtothe world, subscription to aform of repressive transcendence,infatuation with atype of religious experience diametrically opposed to the dominant "a-religiousness" which is the outcomeof hyper-secularisation.
Until 1968, liberation consisted of getting rid of the tracesofany unwarranted transcendence:patriarchy,the institutional forms of the Christian religion (particularly Catholicism), the refusal of hierarchy,the desire to satisfy onessexuality outside the framework imposed by traditionand the quest for meaningthrough individualisation and the searchf or personal happiness. Nowadays,n ot much remains of the hierarchical forms of yesteryear to be challenged or demolished. These are being replaced by anew form of anxiety which is one of solitude in a world in whicht he decline of meaningi se xperienced at all levels of existence, both at the level of the workplace (no strong collective organisation at trade-union level) and at political level (no party which representsthe sacred, as did the erstwhile Communist Party or the Republicanism which combined liberty and equality through fraternity). Politicalcitizenship which governedthe relationship to the sacred and in one way meant resort to religionw as strictly private is no longer operational, the appeal to a" public religion" in the guise of radicalised Islam becomes very attractive in the eyes of anumber of young people who regret the absence of any meaningfulness.
Female martyrdom or regressivepost-Feminism
In Europe,and particularly in Francesince the civil war in Syria in 2012, we are witnessing the emergence of af emaleJ ihadi, the novelty of whichr esides in particular in the appreciable increase in their numbers (previously,female Jihadis were the exception;atthe momentwefind severalhundred Europeanwomen in Syria and others who wanted to go therebut were prevented from doing so by the authorities).
Another characteristic of these young women is that there are ag ood many adolescents or post-adolescents alongside other women in theirtwenties or thirties.Theseadolescents or post-adolescents are often in adream world which is not ar esult of Jihadism,b ut at best of pre-Jihadism,p rojecting fantasies onto their involvement which, strictly speaking,h ave little relation to the reality of the ideological and mental world of radicalisation.
At hird characteristic is that the majority are of middle-classo rigina nd not working-class or from apoorer suburb.
Af ourth specific feature is that ag reat many of them are converts:f rom Christianity, Judaism (a few cases), or even Buddhism or agnostic or atheist families.
Being of middle class origin, just like the men from the same social class, 13 the main motivation for their departuret ot he war zones in Syria is not hatred of society. Several approaches interact, triggering their departure.I nt he first instance, ad istorted vision of humanitarian action:t heir brothers in religion (Sunnites) need help,c onfronted as they are with the heretic and evil power of Assad (an Alawite,considered adeviant sectbythe Sunnites) andone shouldtake up armstobealongside the men. Theimage of the idealised man is also the focal point of these young women who are often post-adolescent and disappointed with the feminism of their mothers or grandmothers.There is almost an idealisationof the masculine virility of those who expose themselves to death and who,inthis confrontation, demonstrate their virility,t heir seriousness and their sincerity. These three adjectives give meaning to the "ideal husband". Additionally,heis apparently "serious". By fighting the enemy, he reveals apermanent commitment unlike these young men, whose behaviour reveals aspects of immaturity and volatility in the eyes of these girlsw ho seem to have deposedt he imageo ft he Father.They are seeking aform of masculinity in the superlative, coupled with the gravityofimperturbability in the face of death. These young men, preparedfor martyrdom,personify the clichØ of the ideal man. Finally,the third characteristic of these youthsistheir sincerity:since they accept to die for their ideal, they are likely to be "sincere" with their wives,their degree of reliability being evaluatedin terms of their capacity to demonstrate their authenticity on the battle field. This type of young man, personifyingthe cardinalvirtues of truthfulness,isapparently the ideal type of man to marry to avoid the malaise of the instability and everincreasing fragility whichcharacterises moderncouples.They are often children from step-families in France, having experienced the vulnerability of their parents conjugal liaisons and the loss of masculinity in divorceproceedings. They reject boththe imageofthe man and of the woman as it appears in modern society. They are seeking af orm of utopia, in the anthropological sense in which the feeling of confidence and absolute sincerity would be combined with that of "acceptable inequality". TheJihadi sites in the Islamist State (Daesh) who know how to manipulate the feelingso ft hese young women and exploit this type of fascination by speaking of the noble image of the woman, whoi sa pparently sheltered from modern instability and has absolute confidence in the man who is apparently amajorsupport (he is a"hero") and an unwaveringtower of strength (he is in no way effeminate,h ek nows how to fight and meet thec hallenge of adversity). Abovea ll, an aively romantic vision of love is combined with the attraction of war, or even of violence.Some of these youngwomen are apparently fascinated by the violence of war.
14 Furthermore,the first waves of these young women who have gone to Syria servea s" recruiters"; they send e-mails,w rite blogs,g ive an idealised image of the situationo ft he wife of the "mujahid"( a soldier in theJihad) in Syria. Sometimes,once they arrive,the "muhajirat"(the immigrant women) marry Europeansw ho have joined the ranks of the Jihadi fighters in Syria, like Khadijah Dare,from London, who married aSwede fighting alongside Islamic State and who chose the name of Abu Bakr. 15 In somecases,the violence of war fascinates not only the men, but also the young women. Life in this "special" situation assumes am eaning and an intensity whichm eans they momentarily forget the inferiorsituationofthewoman which is concealedbehind the concept of "complementarity". Thec ultural rapprochement between men and women in Western societies also means that violence is not perceived as it was in the past as being the exclusive resort of the man, as the woman can also participate therein indirectly,atleast by exercising it against other women perceivedasbeing heretics (for example,the Yezidi women or the Assyrians enslaved by the Islamic State,being used to satisfythe sexual desires of the fighters;the runningofthese Islamist brothels is entrusted to young Western women who have converted to Islam. They are members of Al Khansaa, apolice force which imposes Sharia Law on women).
Sometimes the whole family has emigrated to Syria and, as aresult, mothers and daughters meet in this brigade, or in other cases,sisters wholeft together (the case of the 16 years old twins,S alma and Zahra Halane, who have joinedt his brigade). By taking some of these young girls into the brigadesfor the enforcement of their version of the Sharia, the protagonistso ft he Islamic State invest them with aform of legitimacy and in particular, confer on them power over the non-Muslims or the "bad Muslims", who are often older than them.T his repressiongives them afeelingofhaving become adults through the rite of passage of the assertion of their authority over other women. These same authorities encourage these young girls tom arry combatants,p referably Europeans. Adolescentgirls are declaredfit (even from the age of 9years,but this does not apply to the situationofyoung women who leave for Syria) to marry and to start afamily in which the children will be indoctrinated by the Islamic State.Their excitement at the idea of starting an "Islamic" family of which they vaunt the social standing and in which they would fulfil the idealised role of the motherinthe Caliphate, means that they do not realise that theirimportance is an illusion and their status of woman is inferior,something they refuse to see for the time being. These young girls have often experienced the instability of modern marriage or feel exposed thereto in their generation. As aresult, aunion for "eternity" with achampion of the faith satisfies their quest for aromantically indestructible bond of religiously legitimate love.This would enable them to escape the sinful friendshipsbetween young boys and girls in the monotonous world of aW est devoid of widespread violence.T he war-like atmosphere, the myth of Islamic purity under Daesh, the idea of the heroism of their man and their dignity as future mothers,and finally this world where violence becomes an entertainmentwhich is so totally different from their own country of origin fascinates them for awhile.
Masculine virility,power,authority and the identity crisis
Them odern middle class family tends increasingly to be ar econstituted stepfamily.There are two fathers (the biological father and the "legal" father) and two mothers (the biological mother and less frequently,when the childlives with his or her father, the "legal" mother who is the wife of the father) which creates aspace in which the child can benefit from more room for manoeuvre than in the past, by manipulating the authority of each memberofthe couple.T he multiplication of sourcesofauthority weakensitand at the moment, unlike the traditionalpatriarchal family,inwhich the child suffered from too much paternal authority,the rise in sources means the child can play one against the other and exercising authority becomes asourceofstress and uncertainty for the parents.Furthermore, the rights of the child as a" pre-adult" means that the child becomes aware of certain rights earlier than in the past.T he requirements of life and the length of studies meanthat children may stay with their parents thus extending adolescence and its affective and economic dependence much later than in the past. This area for manoeuvre is also an area of stress:t he dispersion or even absence of authority,the dizziness experienced when the youngpre-adult is confronted with the space for manoeuvre available and which, via the use of internet, enables immersioninworlds other than that of the parents,where he or she can live avirtual existence,seems to them to be terriblyr eal given the lack of solid anchoringof authority in their symbolic world. Theresult is that Jihadismplays on both these registers,b yt he use of the Internet but also by giving young adolescents the impression that they can become adults by embracing the cause of radicalIslam.
On one hand there is acrisis in parentalauthority,onthe other the diversification of imaginary worlds in which the virtual and the real tend to become indistinguishable through the interpositionofsocial networks;finally in addition, adaily reality for girls is the impression of being surrounded by immature young boys who have lost their" virility" and have relinquishedt heirm asculine superiority of intelligenceand know-how.Girls can now confront them in these areas on an almost equal footing.T he demoting of young men is concurrent with the glorification of the young Jihadi whomthe girls try to marry.What makes him so irresistible?T he answer is loud and clear:c onfrontation with death. This is the touchstone of four fundamental features which are to some extent the portrait of the ideal man for these young girls:s erious,s incerity,v irility,s tability and confidence. Contrary to the young boys whomt hey frequent and who no longer appear "serious",the Jihadisare "deadly serious". They are in afight to the death with the enemy,they personifythe "reality"oflife and not this effeminate attitude of young men who take life lightly;they are alsoa"pillar of support" on whom young women can learn to bear the burden of an increasingly heavy life.T he woman of the future must not only earn her own living,but also be responsible for the home. She must live with aman who is far from appearing perfect, having lost his symbolic status in personal relationships,i nt he first instance in the family where the erstwhilepatriarchal authority has collapsed or the non-differentiation of male and female roles has resulted in adistressing lack of symboliccontent, or even ade-sublimation of boththe father and the mother. Theman who confronts death reconnects with masculine values;hegives content to "virility", the revival of archaic relations and the masculine ideal which can only survive at the cost of confronting death, not life.Itisasifeverydaylife engenders considerable anxiety which can only be surmounted by the idealisation of this new male,who fills the mentalvoid in which one struggles for lack of any legitimate source of authority. Theyoung woman considers that she can lean on this new man, asuperman whose violence raises him above the crowd and creates meaning. We are reminded of these young women who write love letters to convicted criminals in prison, of-fering them their bodies and souls,even to those who,like Guy Georges (a serial killer and rapist of several women who got letters from young women wishing to be his lover for along time), have committed dreadful sexual crimes,orAntonio Ferrara (oneo ft he protagonistso fo rganized crime)w ho got love letters from young women who admired his "outstanding qualities" and his exceptional masculinity.Sincerity is apparently the dominant feature of these fighters for the faith and young girls could entrust them with their destinies,w ith no fear of disappointment, given their distance from the peaceful (and by definition down to earth) life that these women live.Anaïve romanticism combinedwith aquest for the exotic, as achange from everyday reality,characterises theseyoung women in search of the absolute in the guise of aman who would satisfy their need for the ideal man, constantly disappointed by the "immature" youngm en whomt hey meet in their social circles.
Theq uest for authority at any price means that poweri ni ts most repressive form is eagerlys ought. Thea im is not only to "subject oneself willingly" to the repressive power (Daesh becomes the personification of this type of legitimacy), but to seek to do so fervently;the greaterthe repression, the greater the attraction.C onsequently,t here ensues ad esperates earch for" repressive transcendence" to guard against the absence of meaning in this widespread immanence in which we live,a nd where the new configuration of the family,t he political and social order prioritises egalitarianism. But this form of the sacred is fragile and open to anumber of weaknesseswhich means it is easily desacralized.Inahypersecularsociety in whichnothing seems to be amatter for the sacred any longer, the only form of sacrality which resists this demotion is repressive in nature,like an archaicf orm of meaningt oc ounter the absence of meaning in social relations which are no longer in any way sacred and have even becomeprofane.
Why then is Islam the preferred choice in thisq uest for meaning? First and foremost, because of the vacuum in violent extremism on the ideologymarket: Action directe,t he Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhoff group all belong to the past. Theextreme right is asource of inspiration to somebut does not convey an ideology of sacrality.Atthe most, it presents avision of democracyasnolonger sacred,identifying the immigrant as the enemy to be overcome. Islam in its Jihadi version meetstwo contradictory requirements of the new Europeanmiddle-class youth:o no ne hand, its vision is inherently anti-imperialist and on the other, hyper-patriarchal.Those who wish to fight the new world order dominated by the UnitedS tatesf ind ideological resources therein, and those who suffer from an identity crisis and have an eed for an absolute transcendence find therein an inexhaustible source of repressive sanctification.Y oung men with ac astration complex as ar esult of women entering all spheres of society can join (theya re promised the restoration of a"patriarchy of heroes" which is attributed to divine will). Young women who complain of their disappointment with post-feminism in which they have to earn theirlivingand deal with domesticissues are ensured of a new life in whichthey will be the "complements" of men. They will have the noble role of looking after the family without having to worry about the financialaspects which are ensured by men. Aboveall, they will be re-enchanted by the new role attributed to them of being the mothero ff uture Jihadis.T he nobility of these young men will reboundonthem and theirnew social role;will in the future satisfy their desire for an undeniable exoticism.With this mental attitude,the fact that a young girl is leaving for Syriacan serve as an encouragement forh er friends to follow her,competitionwithin the group and the groupdynamicsofthe desire to do like everyone else becoming important factors.
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Theyoung women who leave may or may not be of Muslim origin. Even when they do come fromaMuslim family,most of the parents do not see the change in attitude of the young woman and remain in their own world in which communication with their children continuesu naware of these new motivations. This ignoranceisanindication on one hand of the wideninggap between the two worlds, that of the adolescent and that of the adult, and on the other,the weakening of the concept of authority which, formerly,servedtoinstil in young people normative forms of behaviour, independently of their own vision of the world. At the moment, the weakening of patriarchal authority and its exercise by several persons, along with the non-internalisation of imposed modelso fb ehaviour, creates a distancing effect. This may go as far as atotal break with the family in the name of an ideal which the young personc hooses either on social networks or in their complicity with friends of both sexes,w ithout their parents knowledge.T hey often suspectnothing. Take the case of the 14 year old Muslim girl wholived in Argenteuil, in the Va ld Oise; she left homeo naW ednesday and sent at ext message to her parentsa t6pm, asking them to look under her mattressi nh er room for the letter she had put there.She explained that she was leaving for Syria to be able to be free to follow her religion. 
The situation of adult women
We also find middle class adult women and women from the poorer suburbs who have left for Syria. In some cases,whole families,including the mother, have left France for Syria. In other cases,w omen have chosen Jihadism,d enoting ac onsiderable autonomy in relation to their spouse.I nt his respect, Hayat Boumedienne,26years old, born into an Algerian family of 7children, is paradigmatic. Her mother died when she was 6y ears old. She and someo fh er brothers and sisters were taken into care.She became acashier;in2009 she met Coulibaly and left her job,because she wanted to wear afull face veil. She left for Tu rkey on 2 January 2015, afew days before Coulibaly started his fatalattacks and left Turkey for Syrianot long before the attacks. This means we can presume that she knew about Coulibalysd ecisiona nd his desire to die as am artyr in confronting the police.She apparently chose her own way,being pregnant and intending to join Daesh to bring up her child and live her own adventureasaJihadi woman. Her vision of the world is totally different from that of the young middle class women and their hare-brained romanticism, due to being raised in an institution as a product of povertyand being Coulibalyspartner. She shares the world view of her "husband" who hated society and whose Islamisation was primarily the consecration of this hatred. Her proactive approach (she chose adifferent way from her husband) expressed atype of autonomy on the partofsome Jihadi women, who share the ideals of their husband but opt for ad ifferent way (departure to Syria), rather than remaining by their side.Her example, like that of many young women who have gone to Syria,demonstrates that the customary interpretation which designates them as "victims" of fundamentalismo ro ft he Arab-Muslim patriarchy is clearly defective.They take initiatives, behave as true protagonists of the holy war and assert this attitude quite unambiguously. Jihadism reveals,a t least among young adult women, an undeniablec apacity for individualisation, even if their self-assertion will end in their being relegatedt oasituation of insurmountable inferiority,once they have accepted to live under theaegis of the IslamicState of Syria and Iraq.
Alongside these young girls and women who opt for Jihadism,harbouring the illusiono fr ecognition,w hereas it is inferiority which awaits them, we find the diametrically opposite example amongstthe Kurds.The women Peshmergas have taken up arms againstDaesh and have succeeded in gaining recognition in astatus -e ven if still ill-assured -o fe quality with men, creating ab reach in the male privilege of handling deadly weapons in the struggle against the enemy.
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Tw enty-six year old Hasna Ait Boulahcen, awoman of Moroccan lower middle class immigrant origin, is another example. At the age of 8, she was placed in a childrenshome and developedmental difficulties as aresult of the break-upof her family home.S he could not settle in af osterf amily and often ran away. Whereas the Boumedienne case is that of ayoung woman who knows whatshe wants and becomes involved in the Jihadi venture to assert her autonomy with respecttoher partner,Amedy Koulibaly,Hasna gives the impression of ayoung woman who is lost and who joins in aspirit of adventuretoassert herself in forms of radicalisation, which are frequently simulated.She finds herself implicated in terrorism when her cousin, Abdelhamid Abaoud, asks if he can stay with her after the 13 November attacks. TheJ ihadism of young adult women seemst ow aver between these two models of self-assertion(Boumedienne) and an identity which hesitates betweenindecision and pretence at Jihadism (Boulahcen).
Jihadi propaganda and its impact
TheAlQaida form of Jihadismwas built on the membership of young people and propaganda for the West by means of electronic journals,such as Inspire hosted by Anwar al Awlaki, an American of Yemenite origin, who was killed by American dronesi nS eptember 2011. There were also supporters and resources from the internet. But this was all rather amateurish compared with the new Islamic State, Daesh,which had specialised servicestoattract young peoplefrom all over the world. It is estimatedthat between ten and twenty thousand foreigners have gone to Syria in support of the Jihadis;o ft hese,b etween two and four thousand are Europeansand this includes afew hundredwomen and young girls.Every effort is made to attractmen and women to take up the struggle againstthe opponents of this new State.I nt he videos for young women on YouTube,t herei st he glorification of adifferent form of femininity,the insistence on their religious duty and their capacity to have as table and pure family in which the sincerity of the combatants for the Faith would give meaning to their lives. Other strategies, dependento na ge and social origin have also been used;f or example that participation in the Jihad would put an end to depression (sic!)and that the HolyWar would be acure against this chronic mental illness in the West, the latter message being aimed at men but being equallya pplicablet ow omen.
19 Young women, sometimes referred to as "Caliphettes" in reference to the Caliphate set up by Daeshexhort young girlsand women on social networks to come and join them to defendI slam and marry one of the "fighters for the Faith". 20 Thep ropaganda instituted by Daesh via the Internet is now much more widespread and professional than under Al Qaida;itencourages young women to leave theirfamilies and join the hordes of Jihadis in Syria. By appealing to them directly,D aesh primarilyg ives adolescents the impressiono fb eing fully fledged adultsa nd of being recognised as such, capable of founding afamilybut also of havingchildren, attributesw hich in the West are reserved for adults and which, cleverly manipulated,g ives them the impression of being taken seriously by this new Islamic state even if they are treated as under age at home. Theeuphoria of being grown up before 18 masksthe inferiority which this will induce;women are confinedtoa role of producing progeny and managing the household in adivision of labourin which they would find themselves confinedt ot he private sphere.T he manipulation,which is cleverlyorchestrated, consists of giving them theillusion of being adultsasofarightwhereasthey are not.F ascination with adulthood before the legal age and the privilege of participatinginthe adult world in the land of Islam, provestobeapowerful motive for ahasty departure,unknown to their parents who are now perceived as ahindrance in the access to this state of enjoyment of full rights whicht hey so desire.T he illusion of so doing before the legal age 19 Siddique 2014 . 20 Halicek /Pandith 2015 exhilarates young girls in search of recognition, and theiri mpatience to be independent.
Overall, the highly developed, if not sophisticated, nature of Jihadipropaganda consists not so much in stressing the ideology, as the emotions and the impression of well-being, inspiring in men warrior virtues and in women the cult of masculine virility in the confrontation with death.Inaword, the female version of Jihadism was very exceptional before the civil war in Syria.E uropeanw omen as Jihadis were extremely rare and amongstthem one can find converts (Muriel Degauque) as well as immigrant-origin Muslim women. With the departure to Syria, we witnessthe flow of women and young middle classadolescentorpost-adolescent girls to Syria. This new phenomenon has cultural origins in the break-up of the traditional family,but also social origins and in particular the effect of imitation within the group and the desire for self-assertion,inparticular in the choice of a man with exceptionalqualities,capable of sacrificing his life for his ideal. In short, this is am an who personifiest he status of hero. It is also the outcome of the rapprochement of attitudes of young men and women after severald ecades of feminist culture in the West.
Jihadism which, in France,w as primarily ap henomenon fostered by life in deprived suburbs (with rare middle class instances)i st hus extending to middle class youths,the girls becoming distinctly morenumerous than in the past.Inthe middle classes,the dichotomy between men and women does not exist to the same extent as in the poorers uburbs,a nd the behaviour of men and women is increasingly homogeneous in practice.What attracts men has aquantifiable effect on women despite the psychological differences which separate them.
Furthermore,t here is am ajor difference betweent he propaganda of Daesh and that of Al Qaida. Daesh "individualises" the martyr and the Jihad warrior, giving him aspecific face in his video sequences and does not particularly insist on the religious dimension of their involvement,b ut on the exceptionaln ature of their actionaswell as on their heroism and their romanticism. Forexample,wesee fightersfor the faith in tears,and openly manifesting their emotionswhich has no equivalent in Al Qaïda. Whereas Al Qaïda advocates adegree of revolutionary asceticism, Daesh,f or example, shows young fighters bathingi nariver, thus exaltingasense of "Jihadi tourism" which is not found in Al Qaïda. Al Qaïda highlights the celibacy of the fighters,while Daesh endeavours to marry them with one another so that they constituteafamily in the Islamic State.The advertising in "Islamic State"gives very little space to religion,exalting the impressionofwarlike virilityand of exceptional heroism amongst these young adepts rather than references to Islam strictly speaking.
On the whole,t he Jihadi propaganda targeting young Europeans isd one by Europeansinthe pay of Daesh and this is why the accentisonwhat will attract them and draw them to Syria.
Death as aguideline in Jihadism
Jihadism in Europe enteredanew phase with the civil war raging in Syria. Almost every country in Europe has sent its contingent of Jihadis to this country and their overalln umber is estimated to be several thousand. There are also those from countries like Tu nisia (roughly 3,000 Jihadis) and Pakistan (several hundred) where there are people who may have directlinks with France (Tunisia)and in the UK (Pakistan).
This phenomenon shows the interlinking of atransnationalproblem (the war in Syria) with social and cultural problems in European countries.T he transnationalisation of economics and politics leads tot ransnationalisation of the imagined Umma(the "neo-Umma")and, above all, the possibility of mobilisation of young people,both women and men, in the West (including America but to a lesser degree) towardsachievingits goals as promoted in the Daesh propaganda. Jihadism shows the increasingly globaliseddimension of this neo-Umma and of the subjectivity inclinedtowards it, particularly amongst the new generations.The quest for an ew utopia and the feeling of profound injustice combines with the search for individual happiness and adventure in Jihadism, which reaches almost all strata of society.Paradoxical as it may seem in this situation,what unites the three categoriesofyoung people(young menfrom the poorer suburbs and from the middle classesand the young girls and women) is death.Death becomes the guideline of their troubled psyche.F or young people from the deprived suburbs who are excluded socially and have internalised this exclusion as aform of radicalism, death becomes af undamental category which makes them feel "invulnerable" as comparedtopeople who feel lost whenconfronted with death. This is the foundation of their "superiority"over frightened opponents,who do not know how to deal with the agonies of death,f or lack of as tronga ttachment to the Absolute.There is ataste for revengeinthis capacity to overcome death which is basedonthe desire to disparage life in this world,with its lack of respect and selfrejection by internalising the afore-mentionedlack of respect. Thesaving death or martyrdom is ad eliveryi nt wo respects:t he first is the break with as ocietyi n which one has never felt at ease,given the extent to which one has been aprey to malaise andrejection by others;the second is that the other world is the sceneof happiness for the martyr who will be in heaven, all their desires fulfilled, eternal joy being his rewardsfor his courage and his desire to imposethe will of God by the sword.
From this perspective,death is the only pointwhere fates are sealed and unsealed;adestiny founded on the rejection by others in turn becomesrejection of others.This two-fold dialectic is combinedina"desire for death" which reverses the vector of life by associating the desire to die with the desire to kill the other, the opponent, the world surrounding the young rebel. Henceforth he or she lives to espouse the fate of the negative hero 21 by killing others.T his type of hero achieves his goals by being totally rejected by the others,his goals makinghim a feared and detested person who achieves fame through notoriety. He kills,a s Mohamed Merah did, Muslim soldierswho are the sworn enemies of Islam, but also Jews,these representatives of Israeli "arrogance" and "contempt" for Muslims in general in the Middle East.
Foryoung middle classJihadis,death is declined in another mode.Itisnot so much hatredofthe other but agame with death which presides over their experience of martyrdom. They make light of life in the confrontation with death on the battlefield in Syria to overcomethe virtuality of alife,which is spentprimarily in aprocess of lossofprestige and self-esteem. Men are aligned with women in a unisexculture in which differences are maskedand similarities exaggerated (the same clothes, the same dishevelled look,the same forms of kindness with no hint of the virility of the past). Thev ery meaning of the sacred in ah yper-secular society, where there is almost no space for the religious,i sd isappearing. The virtual and the real world are aligned in these video games where the frontier between the two tends to fade.Finally life and death are aligned in an extended adolescence where the impression of invulnerability is now combined with the spectacle of others being killedand, in extremis,almost inadvertently,even oneself,onthe battlefield where one can die or kill as if by magic in an atmosphere of amusement which recalls that of the games on the Web.
Finally, for the young women and girls whog ot oS yria to be enlisted by the Islamic State (Daesh), deathisthe sign of their adherence to the seriousness of a male world, away of trustingmen who brave death, but also away of exposing themselvestodeath in turn, by virtue of this "unisex"culture which tendstobe increasingly preponderantinthe lives of young people where girlsand boys have never had such an extensive cultural proximity.I nt his case,d eath becomes the link between the three groups,the young men, those from the deprived suburbs, those from the middle classes but also the young girls,m ainly of middle class origin, who are going to join the heroessymbolically rubbing shoulders with their heroism (not so frequently in reality), baskingi np art of their glory while managing their sexual and family lives.
The increasing importance of siblings
In order to counteract the penetration of the security branchofthe police force into the workingsoftheir action,Jihadists increasingly choose family ties which bond the loyalty of brothers,oreven other members of the family in the service of violentaction. Merah benefited from at least the complicity of his brother (2012 attacks), withouthim being directly involved in the attacks;the Kouachi brothers (2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks) cooperated directly in the killings,t he Abdeslam brothers (13 November 2015, Bataclan attacks) demonstrate how family ties can be exploited to ensure that the group is not infiltrated by the security branch of the police;religious radicalisationalso creates abond which cements ties,which have been significantly eroded by delinquency and the break-up of families.
Furthermore,t he sight of ac lose-knit family involvedinajoint projects ymbolically reconstitutes the united family of the past, before the break up of families like those of Merah or Kouachi. In this reconstitutedfamily, it is not egalitarianism, but the hierarchy of younger/older which reignseven if in real life,the symbolic elder brother is the younger in terms of age (this was the case of the Kouachi brothers where the younger brother made the decisionsand the elder one followed). Finally,c rossing swords with as ocietyw hich one hates is as hared passion which unites and creates aharmonious image of the patriarchal family in its "militant"v ersion that now lives togetherw ith the brothers (and sometimes even the sister) reconstitutingaunity which had been shattered.
The civil war in Syria and the reservearmy of Jihadists in Europe
Jihadism is one illustration of the globalisationofthe phenomena of war. Now the civil war in Syriah as its counterpart in France:D aesh transposes thisw ar elsewhere,t oR ussia (the explosion of the Russian planei nf ull flight at Sharm elSheikh on 31 October 2015, killing 224 passengers), to Lebanon (explosions on 12 November 2015 killing at least 43 people),Tunisia (18 March, 19 people were shot and killed, mainly foreign tourists, 26 June,38people were killed, mainly British tourists) and the list is not exhaustive. This civil war has spinoffs in France as a result of the involvement of French aviation in Syria.Daesh has allowed afew of its adepts to join the refugees fleeing the repression of the Syrianarmy and the radicalIslamists.One of these seemstohave implemented his plan of attack in Paris (using aSyrian passport, the bearer of which went throughGreece). Thenew Islamicstate is conducting "a total war" all over the world, with innocent people paying for acts of war carried out by national governments.Henceforth Islamist radicals appear to consider the distinction between civilians and combatants outdated;they dehumanize their victims and put them to death in the nameofa faith which is firmly rooted in their minds. Thedeprived suburbs have becomethe reserve army of Jihadism:uptoJ anuary 2015, almost all the French Islamist terrorists who succeeded in implementing theirattacks came from deprived suburbs.The publichousing estates have become places where an activist minority no longeri dentifiesw ith any citizenship agenda and go as far as waging the Holy Waragainst societyasawhole. Daesh and Al Qaïda draw on this reserve army,the cultural foundation of their adherence to ideologies of hate being their resentment with society which to them personifies the ultimate cause of their malaise.P eople who have broken with social life,destroyed by racism and prejudices express their willingness to fight, kill and die,taking their revenge on societyatthe expense of killing hundreds,if not thousands,ofinnocents. Islam becomes the principle of sanctification of their hatred and anythingwhich promotes this desire for vengeance takes on areligious meaning. TheJihad, in this conception, is awar without mercy and without end againstt he world which has rejected them and whichi sn ow "ungodly" if not "heathen". It is quite legitimate,even worthyofpraise,touse excessiveviolence againstit. God is personified in aposture of blind violence in amorbid religiosity which totally dehumanizes the opponent.This includesall those who do not think like the fanatic and who only consider this excessive violence to be sacred in meaning.
Them iddle classesa lso contribute to this Jihadi reserve army.T he 13 November2015 attacks revealed the involvementofyoung middle class people,in particular Sami Amimour who had worked for the RATP as abus driver, or Salah Abdeslam, who had in turn been at echnician at the tram terminal and the manager of abar.
WhileinFrance,almost all the perpetrators of the successfulJihadiattacks up to January 2015 have been young people from the deprivedsuburbs.Inthe UK, from the beginning the scene has been more complex (in the July 2005 attack on the underground and the bus in London, of the four main protagonists,the leader, Siddique Khan, 30 years old, worked in ap rimary school. Shehzad Taneer,2 2 years,worked in afish and chip shop). None of the four had any known past of delinquency.A sfrom November 2015, the intervention of the middle classes in Jihadi attacks became much more frequent, even in France (at leastthree of the eight Jihadi protagonists were of middle class origin).
Conclusion
Thes trongs olidarities of the welfare state,i ncluding working-class solidarity, have declined and nothing has taken their place in as ociety where narcissistic individualismh as become the rule.B oth amongst working classes and middle classes, there is aloss of hope in the future and loss of expectations.T he lack of reference points is asource of confusion for young people,who have little identification with nobleideals and utopias. TheWest seems unable to end repression and humanitarian crisis in Syria. Finallyy oung people in deprived areas are powerless and desperate.T hese are all social facts,w hich promote Jihadism. Addressing them will not end extremist Islam, but will considerably reduce its attraction.
